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Abstract. Motivated by the observation that the down payment policy in China is government-controlled and pro-cyclical 
based on the housing market, I construct a heterogeneous DSGE model to study the relationship between China’s down 
payment policy, property tax, and economic fluctuations. The results indicate that an increasing down payment ratio sup-
presses the speculative belief and decreases household’s housing demand. This in turn pulls housing prices down and 
smoothes the economic fluctuations. By way of counterfactual exercises, I also find that the down payment policy and the 
property tax can be substitutes for each other. If there is an active down payment policy, the implementation of property 
tax shall be prudently deliberated by the Chinese government.
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Introduction
The 2008 financial crisis in the U.S. has led to an increas-
ing number of studies on the potential link between the 
housing market and the real economy. Chinese housing 
prices have increased rapidly in recent decades (Chen & 
Wen, 2017). Recognizing the potential importance of the 
housing market to the economy, this paper studies the link 
between them in China. However, instead of emphasizing 
the channel of using housing as collateral, I focus on the 
Chinese down payment policy, which is a crucial macro 
policy targeted in the housing market. According to the 
data from the National Bureau of Statistics, it has a strong 
relationship with the real economy.
In China, the down payment policy is government-
controlled1 and pro-cyclical based on the housing market. 
The related documents about down payment ratio issued 
by the central government since 2003 are presented in Ta-
ble 1. The average and legal minimum down payment ra-
tios from 2003:Q3 to 2016:Q2 are concluded in Table 2. It 
is clear that the down payment policy has been frequently 
used. During the 13 years from 2003 to 2016, 13 docu-
ments have been issued by the central government. And 
1  From 2003 to 2016, the Std. Dev. of the down payment ratio 
in the U.S., U.K, and China are 5.56, 1.23 and 9.17 respectively. 
The government-controlled down payment policy in China 
has larger fluctuations than those of other countries.
the down payment policy has been used more and more 
frequently. Since September 2014, the down payment ratio 
has been adjusted four times. As China currently has no 
property tax, the down payment policy can be recognized 
as one of the most effective and important tools by which 
the Chinese government targets the housing market.
Furthermore, as shown in Figure 1, the down payment 
ratio has a significant effect on the real economy.2 The sol-
id line indicates the tight down payment policy with in-
creasing down payment ratio, while the dash line denotes 
the loose down payment policy with the decreasing down 
payment ratio (i.e., from 2014 to 2016, the down payment 
ratio continues to decline in Table 2). It is clear that after 
the down payment policy is loosened, there is always an 
obvious increase in GDP growth. After the down payment 
policy is tightened, the GDP growth rate declines. Com-
bining with Table 2, it seems that the down payment pol-
icy influences the GDP growth rate cycles by responding 
pro-cyclically to the economic cycles of housing market.3
2  Since two of the documents in Table 1 only point out policy 
orientation without precise down payment adjustment, so 
there are only 11 changes in Figure 1.
3  Based on the Statistical Yearbook of China, the Chinese hous-
ing market is important as it makes a contribution to GDP 
growth rate by more than 11.96%.
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This paper examines the down payment policy’s ef-
fects on China’s economic fluctuations in a heterogeneous 
DSGE model. Cutler, Poterba, and Summers (1990), Bar-
beris, Greenwood, Jin, and Shleifer (2015, 2018) introduce 
“feedback traders” whose demand is based on the history 
of past returns rather than the expectation of future fun-
damentals. Brock and Hommes (1998) also investigates 
the dynamics of asset price with heterogeneous beliefs to 
explain the price fluctuations. Since housing serves both 
as a consumer good and an investment product, I wish to 
extend a standard DSGE model to incorporate heteroge-
neous beliefs based on behavioural economics, which lays 
a micro foundation for a standard DSGE model.
I also examine the important influence of the down 
payment policy on the housing market and the real econ-
omy fluctuations by a quantitative general equilibrium 
work. This kind of work is related to a growing strand of 
literature (Glaeser, Gyourko, & Saks, 2005; Davis & Heath-
cote, 2007; Fisher, 2007; Iacoviello, 2005; Iacoviello & Neri, 
2010; Favilukis, Ludvigson, & Van Nieuwerburgh, 2017). 
Although it is widely accepted that the government’s down 
payment policy could have an important influence on 
housing prices and macroeconomic fluctuations, quantita-
tive studies in a general equilibrium framework have been 
scant. This paper aims to fill part of this gap by modelling 
in a quantitative general equilibrium framework.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 
presents the model, section 2 highlights the basic mecha-
nism under calibration by quantitative analysis and the 
last section concludes.




















Figure 1. GDP growth rate and the down payment policy
Table 1. Down payment policy documents (data source: The People’s Bank of China and the State Council)
Time Document name
2003.6 Notice on further strengthening the management of real estate credit business
2005.3 Notice on the adjustments of commercial bank housing credit policy and the excess reserve deposit interest rate
2006.5 Notice on adjusting the housing credit policy
2007.9 Notice on strengthening the management of commercial real estate credit
2008.12 Opinions on promoting the healthy development of the real estate market
2009.12 Four regulations from the State Council (Guo si tiao in Chinese)
2010.4 Notice from the State Council on curbing the excessive rise in housing prices in some cities
2011.1 Notice from the State Council on further improving the regulation and control of the real estate market
2013.2 New five regulations from the State Council (Guo wu tiao in Chinese)
2014.9 Notice on further improving housing financial services
2015.3 Notice on personal housing loan policy issues
2015.9 Notice on further improving the differentiated housing credit policy
2016.2 Notice on the adjustment of individual housing loan policy
2016.10 Some local governments increase down payment ratios4
Table 2. Down payment ratio (national level, %) (data source: The People’s Bank of China and the State Council5)
Quarters
Average down payment ratio
Trend
The year-on-year 













st suite 2nd suite
2003Q3-2008Q3 24.44 20.00 31.90 31.90 Tight 28.31 20 30
2008Q4-2009Q4 20.67 20.00 21.33 21.33 Loose 12.35 20 20
2010Q1-2014Q3 29.30 27.72 57.98 57.98 Tight 25.10 30 50
2014Q4-2016Q2 26.67 26.67 30.00 44.76 Loose 6.00 20 30
4  Chinese housing market is unusually heated in 2016. Although the central government has not yet issued documents, the down payment 
ratio of 1st suite has already been raised to 35% in Beijing and Shanghai in October 2016. Therefore, the down payment policy is not only 
the most frequently used by the Chinese government to regulate the housing market, but also the policy that is most easily thought of.
5  Government often issues a document in the middle of a quarter, which leads to a non-integer average down payment ratio.
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1. Model
The model makes two extensions to a standard DSGE 
model. First, following Liu, Wang, and Zha (2013), I as-
sume that household holds housing and that housing is 
used as an input in the production of the consumption 
good. Second the heterogeneous beliefs in the representa-
tive household sector are introduced.
1.1. The representative household


















where: ϕ  and ψ > 0, parameter (0,1)b∈  is a subjective 
discount factor; tC  denotes consumption; tH  denotes 
housing holding and tN  denotes labor hour. Denote by 
tw  the real wage, by tθ  the exogenous down payment 
ratio and by tP  the housing price. The budget constraint 
for the household is given by
–1 1
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where: the external borrowing, (1 )t t t tL P H= −θ , equals 
to the non-down payment part of housing purchase. Spe-
cifically, the down payment policy rule follows the sto-
chastic process
1ln lnt t tθ − θθ = r θ + e . (3)
The parameter ( )1,1θr ∈ − , and tθe  is i.i.d. standard 
normal processes.
The household chooses { tC , tH , tN } to maximize (1) 
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= + b . It is clear that the left 
hand side is the marginal cost to buy one unit housing to-
day, which equals to the expected revenue tomorrow plus 
the marginal substitution rate (MRS) of consumption and 
housing at the right hand side. Therefore, with a non-zero 
down payment ratio, the marginal cost to buy one unit 
housing today becomes t tPθ , the expected revenue is 
1
1
(1 )(1 )tt t t t t
t
C
E P r P
C ++
b − + − θ   , and the MRS remains 
the same.
Here I want to introduce the heterogeneous beliefs 
which are commonly used in the behavioural finance. Ac-
cording to Cutler et al. (1990), I introduce an expectation 
rule for household’s expectation ( )tE ⋅  and suppose that 
the house holding decision tH  is affected by two hetero-
geneous beliefs, fundamental belief ftH  and speculative 
belief stH . They are given by
( )ft tH P P= g − , (5)
1( )st t tH P P −= s − , (6)
where: g  and s  > 0, P  denotes the fundamental value 
of house. Equation (5) and (6) imply that housing has 
the utility of living and acts as an asset as well. Increas-
ing housing price on the one hand decreases fundamental 
belief ftH , on the other hand stimulates speculative belief 
stH . It is worth noting that both ftH  and stH  are flow 
variables. Therefore, I refer to Barberis et al. (2018)’s ex-
pectation rule form
1
1 1 1 1
1
The gap of expectated revenue in two periods 
flow variab
(1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )
+(1- )
t t








+ − − −
+





and substitute the rule back into equation (4) which yields
1
1 1 1(1- ) (1 )(1 )
t t
t t ft st t t t t
t t
C C





θ = + + +b − + −θ   ,
where: the parameter m is the weight (fraction) of funda-
mental belief and the left (1 – m) is the weight of specula-
tive belief. Hence, these two heterogeneous beliefs influ-
ence the optimal decision of tH . As the DSGE model is 
a general equilibrium system, the tH  will further affect 
the output.
1.2. The representative entrepreneur
Following Liu et al. (2013), the entrepreneur has the util-
ity function
0






where: etC  denotes the entrepreneur’s consumption. The 
production function is given by
1 1
, 1 1[ ]t e t t etY H K N
φ −φ a −a
− −= , (8)
where: tY , , 1e tH − , 1tK −  and etN  denote output, housing 
holding of entrepreneur, capital and labor respectively, and 
parameters a  and φ ( )0,1∈  measure the output elasticity 
of these production factors. The entrepreneur is endowed 
with 1 0K− >  units of initial capital stock and ,t 1 0eH − >  
units of initial housing holding. Denote tI  and tS  are 
investment and saving respectively, the entrepreneur faces 
the capital accumulation and budget constraint
1(1 )t t tK K I−= − δ + , (9)
, 1 1 -1( ) (1 )et t et e t t t t t t t etC P H H S Y I S r w N− −+ − + = − + + − . 
(10)
The entrepreneur chooses { etC , etH , tS , tK , etN } to 
maximize (7) subject to (8)−(10).
1.3. Market clearing conditions and equilibrium
In a competitive equilibrium, the markets for goods, labor, 
housing and borrowing all clear. The goods market clear-
ing condition implies that
tC + etC + tI = tY . (11)
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The labor market clearing condition implies that labor 
demand equals labor supply
t etN N= . (12)
The housing market clearing condition implies that
1t etH H H+ = = . (13)
The financial market clearing condition implies that
t tS L= . (14)
A competitive equilibrium consists of sequenc-




{ } 0, , , , , , , , , ,t et t ft st et t t t t t tC C H H H H N I Y K S
∞
=
, such that (i) taking the 
prices as given, the allocations solve the optimizing prob-
lems for the household and the entrepreneur and (ii) all 
markets clear.
2. Results
Calibration of the model proceeds as follows. First, I log-
linearized the model around the steady state. Second, I 
fit the log-linearized model to four quarterly China time 
series: the real price of housing holding, real per capita 
consumption, real per capita GDP, and number of em-
ployees.6 The sampled period ranges from 1999:Q1 to 
2015:Q4. Data on China’s macroeconomy are taken from 
the WIND Database, the Ministry of Land & Resources 
and the China Statistical Yearbook.
Table 3 summarizes the calibrated parameter values. 
First, I directly calibrate the set of {a, b, η, δ, φ}, whose 
numbers are commonly used in the literature of China’s 
economy. According to Chang, Liu, Spiegel, and Zhang 
(2018), I set capital share a = 0.5, subjective discount fac-
tor b = 0.996, inverse Frisch elasticity η = 2 which implies 
a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of 0.5 and depreciation 
rate δ  = 0.025. Output elasticity of house holdings φ  is 
calibrated to 0.3 based on Guo, Liu, and Zhao (2015). 
Second, because of data availability, I calculate the aver-
age down payment ratio only starts from 2003:Q1, and 
the θ  is set to 0.3. Barberis et  al. (2018) argue that the 
fraction of fundamental-value traders is about 30% in the 
U.S. stock market. As far as I know, there is no available 
Chinese micro-data to estimate and separate fundamental 
and speculative traders or beliefs, so I set m to 0.3 based 
on Barberis et al. (2018). I will change m and do robust-
ness checks in the simulation section. Third, to match the 
model to the fluctuations observed in the data, I follow 
the approach in Sims and Zha (1998), in which the au-
thors propose a Bayesian method to estimate the model 
parameters. Moreover, I refer to Liu et al. (2013) and Iaco-
viello (2015) for the prior distributions. Table 4 reports the 
estimates of structural parameters at the posterior mode. 
I also report the 90% probability intervals for model pa-
rameters in the table. One can see from Table 4 that the 
estimated shock is persistent and has large standard devia-
6  The data of working hours are not available in China, so 
I choose numbers of employees to measure the labor input.
tion. And by targeting the quarterly time data series, both 
the two beliefs parameters are more precise.
Table 3. Calibrated parameters
Parameter Value Description
a 0.500 Share of capital
b 0.996 Subjective discount factor
η 2.000 Inverse Frisch elasticity
δ 0.025 Depreciation rate
φ 0.300 Output elasticity of house holdings
θ 0.300 Down payment ratio











g InvGamma 0.25 0.50 0.2149 [0.0650,0.3528]
s InvGamma 0.20 0.50 0.1362 [0.0500,0.2245]
rθ Beta 0.50 0.20 0.9278 [0.8798,0.9802]
eθt InvGamma 0.01 inf 0.0213 [0.0184,0.0243]
The Bayesian method includes data information, but 
it mostly depends on the prior disctributions (Liu et al., 
2013). To check the robustness of the calibration, I alter-
natively estimate the θr  and tθe  by the VAR model by 
using the same data in Table 2 and Figure 1:
, , 1, ,ln lnt i i t i t iθ − θθ = r θ + e ,
where: [1,2,3,4]i∈ ; 1/2/3/4 denote the cases “1st suite（> 
90 m2)”; “1st suite（<= 90 m2)”; “2nd suite (no loan)”; 
“2nd suite (with loan)” respectively. As 2i =  is the most 
common case which affects the majority citizens, I cali-
brate the average θr = (0.9278+0.9583)/2 and ,t iθe = 
(0.0213+0.0408)/2 to do the following quantitative exer-
cises. The results are shown in Table 5.
Table 5. Parameters of the shock
Coef. Std. Err. t value P value
rθ,1 0.9067 0.0602 15.05 0.000
rθ,2 0.9583 0.0408 23.46 0.000
rθ,3 0.8900 0.0651 13.67 0.000
rθ,4 0.9161 0.0573 15.99 0.000
Std. Dev. Min Max
eθt,1 0.0794 −0.2375 0.2639
eθt,2 0.0554 −0.1719 0.2813
eθt,3 0.1661 −0.7136 0.6231
eθt,4 0.1661 −0.7136 0.6231
As shown in Figure 2, an increase in the down payment 
raises the household’s first payment (the left hand side of 
equation (4)), and lowers the expected housing resale 
price and revenue (the right hand side of equation (4)). 
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that the representative agent is indifferent between living 
under each regime. In terms of the model variables, the 
welfare gains are measured by ∆ such that
0
1+











 − ∆ + ϕ −ψ =
η  
b∑ , (15)
where: the variables with a superscript tax denote allo-
cations with property tax. With log-utility in consump-
tion, the explicit expression for welfare gains satisfies 
( )ln(1 ) 1/ (1 ) b aV V− ∆ = −b − .
Referring to the property tax rates in U.S., the tax rate 
hτ  is set to 0.0157. Compared with the benchmark model, 
the left hand side of equation (2) has an additional part, 
th tP Hτ , to represent property tax expenditures. The het-
erogeneous beliefs ftH  and stH  satisfy
( ) / (1 )ft t hH P P= g − + τ , (16)
1( ) / (1 )st t t hH P P −= s − + τ . (17)
To keep the resource constraint balanced, there is an 
additional government spending tG = th tP Hτ .
7 The property tax rates in each state of U.S. are different. The 
rate in New Jersey is relatively high, reaching 1.89%. However, 
the rate in Louisiana only accounts for 0.18%. Most of the rates 
range from 1% to 2%. Thus, the median is calibrated.
Therefore, increasing down payment decreases the house-
hold’s housing demand (panel a). As the housing supply 
is fixed in the model, entrepreneur’s housing demand in-
creases (panel b). In detail, the tightened down payment 
policy suppresses speculative belief as it declines rapidly in 
panel d and drives fundamental belief to increase slowly 
in the long run at the same time (panel c).
In panel e, entrepreneur’s rising housing demand 
pushes the housing prices up and the prosperity of the 
housing market promotes a positive output impulse re-
sponse (panel f). However, the increasing down payment 
pulls housing prices down quickly. As a result, the output 
has decreased and comes to the steady state rapidly. Fig-
ure 2 shows that the down payment policy is efficient to 
regulate housing market cyclically in China, which further 
smoothes the real economy.
What might happen if the Chinese government carries 
out a property tax for purpose of macro-control of the 
housing market has recently become a hot topic. In Ta-
ble 6, I show that the down payment policy and property 
tax can be substitutes for each other.
Following Chang, Liu, and Spiegel (2015), I first com-
pute the welfare under the benchmark policy regime (de-
noted by Vb) and under an alternative regime (denoted 
by Va) upon obtaining the Ramsey allocations. Welfare 
gains are then calculated as the percentage decrease in 
consumption in perpetuity under the each regime such 





b: entrepreneur housing demand
x 10–4 x 10–4
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Figure 2. Impulse responses to an (one standard deviation) positive down payment shock
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Table  6 shows that the social welfare remains al-
most regardless of whether the down payment policy or 
property tax is issued. However, social welfare decreases 
0.4521 with an additional property tax policy and endog-
enous variables fluctuate considerably. If the government 
implements the down payment policy and the property 
tax at the same time, the household’s budget constraint 
will be tighten and consumption is crowded out exces-
sively, thus welfare decreases.
Furthermore when I set m = 0.3, the simulation result 
shows that the housing price decreases at the average an-
nual decline rate 12.17% with an increasing down payment 
ratio at the beginning. Specially, housing price decreases 
faster at the first year, then policy effect is gradually weak-
ening. This result is in line with Figure 2. It is worthy noting 
that the decreasing rates are quite mild.8 Decreasing hous-
ing price will increase household’s consumption and social 
welfare. However, with both the down payment policy and 
the property tax, housing price decreases too fast to stabilize 
the economy which leads to welfare loss in turn.
This indicates that the down payment policy and the 
property tax can be substitutes for each other in both 
short term and long term, and the effect is stronger in the 
short term. Because in a DSGE model, one period equals 
to one quarter and 20 quarters is five years. In the long 
run, all the macro-fluctuations will go to the steady-states 
8 According to National Bureau of Economic Research, it will 
be identified as a crisis warning when macro-fluctuations drop 
more than 1/3.
as shown in Figure 2, so the policy effect is stronger in the 
short term than in the long run if other conditions remain 
unchanged. Therefore, if there is an active down payment 
policy, the implementation of property tax shall be pru-
dently deliberated by the Chinese government.
Then I change m’s value to do a series of robustness 
checks. According to the CHFS survey by Southwest Uni-
versity of Finance and Economics in China, the vacancy 
rate of housing in China’s urban areas is 21.4% in 2017 
(higher than 20% of the international warning line). And 
this unusual high vacancy rate implies that the speculators 
have become the main body of Chinese housing buyers. 
Meanwhile, facing the continue increasing housing price, 
the fundamental-value buyers will be more greatly affected 
by the speculative belief than ever. So the speculative be-
lief should be the primary belief, and I choose 0 < m < 
0.5 to ensure that the fundamental belief retreats to the 
second. All the results are robust in Table 6.
Conclusions
Motivated by the observation that the down payment 
policy in China is government-controlled and pro-cycli-
cal based on the housing market, I construct a hetero-
geneous DSGE model to study the relationship between 
China’s down payment policy, property tax, and economic 
fluctuations. In the model, I assume that housing is used 
as an input in the production of the consumption good. 
The heterogeneous beliefs in the representative household 
sector are introduced. This paper finds that an increas-
ing down payment ratio suppresses the speculative belief 
Table 6. Macroeconomic stability and welfare under alternative policy regimes
Only down payment Only property tax Down payment & property tax
Std. Dev. of investment 0.3770 0.1029 0.1064
Std. Dev. of consumption 0.1654 0.1929 0.6312
Std. Dev. of output 0.0354 0.0463 0.1325
Std. Dev. of labor 0.0657 0.0327 0.2519
Welfare gains − 0.0016≈0 −0.4521
Housing price changes (m = 0.3)
Average annual decline rate 12.17% 15.18% 24.62%
The 1st year decline rate 18.17% 17.39% 39.69%
Robustness check: housing price changes (m = 0.4)
Average annual decline rate 12.26% 15.13% 23.59%
The 1st year decline rate 18.20% 17.34% 40.03%
Robustness check: housing price changes (m = 0.2)
Average annual decline rate 12.09% 15.23% 25.67%
The 1st year decline rate 18.17% 17.45% 39.38%
Robustness check: housing price changes (m = 0.1)
Average annual decline rate 12.01% 15.29% 26.76%
The 1st year decline rate 18.15% 17.50% 39.11%
Note: I follow Chang et al. (2015)’s method, and compute the welfare gains at the first-order approximations, for more details please see their footnote 
9. The annual decline rate is computed from the 1st quarter to the 20th quarter (the same with impulse response).
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and decreases household’s housing demand. This in turn 
pulls housing prices down and smoothes the economic 
fluctuations. By way of counterfactual exercises, I find that 
the social welfare remains almost the same when either 
the down payment policy or property tax is issued, while 
social welfare decreases with an additional property tax 
policy. Furthermore, the housing price decreases faster in 
the short term than in the long term with an increasing 
down payment ratio at the beginning.
This paper suggests that first, the down payment policy is 
an effective tool to regulate housing market and output. An 
increasing down payment ratio will decrease housing price in 
both short term and long term. In detail, it causes an aver-
age annual mild decline rate 12.17% and an 1st year decline 
rate 18.17% which is a litter higher than the average. Sec-
ond, the down payment policy and the property tax can be 
substitutes for each other in both short term and long term, 
but the substitution effect is gradually weakening in the long 
term. Therefore, the down payment policy and the property 
tax have almost the same effect on the housing market and 
economic fluctuations. They can be treated as interchange-
able under these circumstances. If there is an active down 
payment policy, the implementation of property tax shall be 
prudently deliberated by the Chinese government.
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